INTRODUCTION
In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty elegantly argued that wealth concentrates, and economic divisions grow, because of a 'fundamental inequality', summed up as r > g. 'When the rate of return on capital significantly exceeds the growth rate of the economy,' wrote Piketty, 'it logically follows that inherited wealth grows faster than output and income.' If growth is 1% and return to capital is 5%, saving just one fifth of returns to capital ensures inherited grows more quickly than the economy (because the one fifth saved exceeds the 1% growth of everyone, including non-capital owners).
3 Piketty (2014) ch 6, 212 (capital), and see also ch 9, 312 (labour) and 331 (executives) 4 The 'marginal utility' of anything that can be sold is often said to be what prices in competitive markets are based upon: the buyer of a good or service will pay the amount that it adds in utility for the buyer's consumption or production. In essence, this suggests 'you get what you pay for' if you buy capital or labour, 'you get what it's worth' if you sell capital, and 'you get what you're worth' if you're working. See originally, WS Jevons, The Theory of Political Economy (1871) ch 1, 'Repeated reflection that true marginal productivity is 'hard to define'. This leaves a market that 'is always embodied in specific institutions', with various 'hierarchical relationships'. 5 Why did inequality decrease following 'the shocks of 1914-1945'? The primary reason, said Piketty, was government 'taxing capital and its income at significant rates', plus high income tax at work, over the mid-20 th century. 6 So, if you want to stop the 'stratospheric pay of supermanagers', the 'drift toward oligarchy', another 'age of inheritance', and a continuation of the 'crisis of globalized patrimonial capitalism ', 7 then 'only dissuasive taxation of the sort applied in the United States and Britain before 1980 can do the job.' 8 But do corporations increase inequality? If they do, tax can make corrections, but failing markets and institutions are unjustifiably driving inequality at the outset. The purpose of this article is to show the evidence that corporations are in fact the most significant 'pre-tax' cause of increasing inequality. 9 Piketty and many more economists writing recently are acutely aware of the corporation's significance (and the same could go for most business associations 10 ) though they have explicitly not aimed to write an account of institutional change. Piketty emphasises that 'historical reality is more complex than the idea of a completely stable capital-labor split suggests', but wanted to 'indicate general principles' to analyse the 'objectively complex problem of governance of large organizations '. 11 Indeed, Piketty's central conclusion is that the 'concrete institutions in which democracy and capitalism are embodied need to be reinvented' based on informed participation in the governance of enterprise: the democratisation of the economy. 12 and inquiry have led me to the somewhat novel opinion, that value depends entirely upon utility.... To me it seems that our science must be mathematical, simply because it deals with quantities.... The ordinary laws of supply and demand treat entirely of quantities of commodity demanded or supplied, and express the manner in which the quantities vary in connection with the price.' Jevons, and anyone else who follows this view, neglects the qualitative aspects of laws underpinning markets and institutions. For a similarly flawed, but perhaps even more straight forward approach, see In re Wragg Ltd [1897] 1 Ch 796, 831, Lindley LJ, 'We must not allow ourselves to be misled by talking of value. The value paid to the company is measured by the price at which the company agrees to buy what it thinks it worth its while to acquire. ' systems, where institutions differ. But when correlations are very close, and the theory is sound, a causal relation becomes persuasive. No doubt there will soon be a flood of interdisciplinary work precisely on this. 21 Regression analysis and controlling variables may achieve an increasingly accurate picture. But the difficulty is that quantitative tools are (by themselves) insensitive to the contextual quality of law: pulling the third bottom thread on two different spiders' webs can have very different results, depending on how the webs are built. So it is with law. This article offers a starter's guide to the web of legal history, with examples of the UK, Germany and the US.
The orthodox view, which this article follows, is that a corporation is a social institution, 22 where law mediates the rights of those who 'institute' the enterprise with their investments of capital and labour. As the simplified chart depicts below, capital today comes mainly from beneficiaries of shareholding institutions who save for retirement. An intermediary asset manager or bank has usually ended up with shareholder rights, instead of the person who actually contributes the capital investment. 23 On the labour side, employees can organise through trade unions who aim to collectively bargain for better terms at work, so the individual is not powerless against the corporate employer in getting a fair deal for their investment of labour. 24 The article does not deal with the additional problems in specific enterprises, in the public or regulated sectors, where markets systematically fail to protect the consumer or public interest. 25 Does inequality matter for a productive economy? This important question will not be dealt with extensively in this article, except to say that it follows the majority view that unjustified inequality damages the economy in three main ways. cf JD Ostry, A Berg, and CG Tsangarides, 'Redistribution, Inequality, and Growth' (2014) IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/14/02, finding inequality generally means lower growth, and modest redistributive tax may increase it. As its focus is tax, it does not deal with the effects from 'pre-tax' institutional framework, as will be tackled here.
money ', 27 is an unjustified agency cost.
28
It causes those groups to work less productively, because they can 'serve their own pockets better by profiting at the expense of the company than by making profits for it.' 29 Second, underpaying employees damages economic productivity, as recognised through classical theory, 30 because if you are unfairly treated, you tend to be demotivated. 31 Third, at a macro-economic level, unequal income and wealth lowers effective aggregate demand because wealthier persons and entities have a higher propensity to save than consume. 32 This either removes that wealth from productive use altogether, 33 or increases transaction costs as savings go through investment chains. 34 Lower effective aggregate demand leads to a lower velocity of money circulating (e.g. less money paid to business, who hire fewer staff, who consume less), ultimately resulting in higher unemployment, perpetuating poverty and inequality once more. Accordingly the minority view that distribution may be segregated from efficiency will be disregarded.
35
This article proceeds on the foot that questions of equality and inequality matter both for a more moral and a more productive economy.
SIGNIFICANTLY DISTRIBUTIVE RULES
Which corporate rules are 'significantly distributive', so as to affect income and wealth the most?
Generally speaking, a corporation's board of directors will conclude contracts on different terms with all contributors to the corporation. This is its primary distributive function. Logically, the ability of each contributor to vote for directors, or influence their actions, will affect the contracts' terms, the distributive balance, most. If you get to choose the people who pay you, it is likely they will pay you more. Relative influence can translate into the relative share of income that each group receives, particularly if the law enables people to act upon conflicts of interest. because even in absence of specific regulation basic institutions like contract and property define the likely consequences for how rights and duties will be distributed.
39
In a world of unequal distribution, wealth and poverty, people with more resources and property can usually 'hold out' longer in any given contractual negotiation.
40
The law of tort, corporations and other associations affects how easily people can organise and take collective action.
41
And law always determines how much information is available or must be disclosed in markets before any contract is enforceable.
42
Thus (1) relative wealth, (2) collective action capacity, and (3) information, are the basic building blocks of bargaining power.
43
At its most fundamental, with more wealth you get more bargaining power. With more bargaining power you can get more influence in the constitutions of corporations. And with more influence you can get more wealth. But the arbitrary, spiralling tendencies of unequal wealth and power need not affect markets and institutions if the standards for enforcing contracts are raised, the default position is that contributors to corporations have meaningful rights, and rights are taken seriously.
(1) EXECUTIVE PAY Perhaps the simplest group of 'significantly distributive rules' (but undoubtedly those to have spilled the most theoretical ink) concern executive pay.
44
The over-rehearsed debate divides 36 cf Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ca 350 BC) Book V, who famously posited that 'corrective' and 'distributive' justice could be distinguished. This distinction, which is fundamental to our understanding of much of private law, does not mean problems of correction are non-distributive (as in remedies for breach of contract, tort, or unjust enrichment). On the contrary, correction is a sub-category of distribution: one of the most important methods of achieving distributive justice. The general requirement to enforce most day to day contracts is full disclosure of material terms, e.g. any securities contract, consumer contract or employment contract. In commercial contracts, the basic requirement is lower: that there should be no misrepresentation. The shift from common law's caveat emptor stance to basic information rights was a highly significant part of 20 th century social evolution. 43 See further E McGaughey, Participation in Corporate Governance (2014) ch 2(3)(a) 44 The term 'executive pay' will be used rather than the more cumbersome 'director remuneration', because executive directors tend to be the greater concern. However, the law discussed here will cover directors as a whole. It excludes management employees, as they usually hold no special constitutional decision-making power, and are subject to directors' prerogative. among two basic positions. First, there are those who contend executive pay reflects the marginal utility of the executives, rewarding them appropriately, like rewards for a sport star who wins a tournament. 45 The fact that a stable, equilibrium market price does not appear to have been reached is beside the point. Executive pay increased since the 1970s because of increasing size and globality of corporations, 46 which, it is said, required greater responsibility and skill.
47
A second basic position is that super-inflationary executive pay is a market failure, and it fails because directors pay themselves. 48 Executive pay, this argument usually continues, is empirically unrelated to company performance. 49 But even if it were, the market-wide rises show it results from arbitrary power not productivity.
50
Other workers are not becoming comparatively stupid, less educated or talented than the 'superstar CEO'. The very functions of directors in large, existing corporations are more like those of skilled bureaucrats than superstars. However much we might fantasise about 'entrepreneurs' leading large companies, 51 those people will be starting new businesses, not ladder climbing in old ones. And when entrepreneurs have built their own companies, they are motivated by their work, not pay: 'performance pay' can even disrupt. It should be noted that there is no particular reason why sport stars necessarily are paid extravagant sums of money, as that development appears to coincide with (highly controversial) changes in ownership and regulation of sport clubs, television, licensing and advertising practices. Lazear and Rosen's argument eludes the possibility that sport enterprises are a classic example of where markets, and ordinary rules of competition law alone, systematically fail consumer (or member) interests.
46
HA Simon, 'On parsimonious explanations of production relations ' (1979) 81 Journal of Economics 459, though this obviously precedes most of the main rises under discussion. It is not clear why firm size per se should justify more pay, although it seems plain that there will be more assets and labour under management from whom a cut may be taken. Review 138, argued 'corporate America pays its most important leaders like bureaucrats. Is it any wonder then that so many CEOs act like bureaucrats rather than the value-maximizing entrepreneurs companies need to enhance their standing in world markets?' The answer is that pay does not magically turn people into entrepreneurs, or attract them, because they usually build their own businesses. Hence, 'the most important financial innovation that I have seen the past 20 years is the automatic teller From these two positions, those who are content with rising pay tend to propose either nothing or transparency, while many opponents of rising pay (but by no means all) advocate greater shareholder control. 55 On this view, pay has risen because the possibility of conflict has run free, and shareholder voice can neutralise the conflicted directors' power. How do these overrehearsed arguments square with the evidence in the UK, Germany and the US? Presumably, if the 'nothing or transparency' argument were sound, there should be no evidence of significant legal change as pay rose. If the 'conflicted director' argument were sound, legal change should be observable when executive pay -and perhaps inequality generally -began rising.
(a) United Kingdom
In the UK, the general position, since the Companies Act 1862, was that director remuneration Table A art 76, with some additions: 'The remuneration of the directors shall from time to time determined by the company in general meeting. Such remuneration shall be deemed to accrue from day to day. The directors may also be paid all travelling, hotel, and other expenses properly incurred by them in attending and returning from meetings of the directors or any committee of the directors or general meetings of the company or in connection with the business of the company.' general meeting setting total director pay. 64 Executive pay was given some attention both in the ' The directors may from time to time appoint any one or more of their body to be managing director or managing directors... generally upon such terms as to remuneration and otherwise as they may determine.' Then, the articles were changed in 1936, to say at art 68, 'The directors may from time to time appoint one or more of their body to the office of managing director or manager for such term and at such remuneration (whether by way of salary, or commission, or participation in profits, or partly in one way and partly in another) as they may think fit...' This followed To give a very small and crude sample, a search at UK Companies House for FT30 companies (the forerunner of the FTSE100) for the period before 1947 showed the following: Fine Spinners and Doublers (reg no. 00236624) art 94 (pay fixed at £750 pa for the chair £500 pa for others, except managing director, or general meeting decided), Harrods (reg no. 00030209) art 63 (£1200 pa or more from general meeting), Imperial Chemical Industries (reg no. 237667) art 83 (£2000 pa, plus 1.5% profits or more fixed by general meeting) Rolls-Royce (reg no. 00087989) art 89 (£150 pa, or more from general meeting) Vickers have done, but this was a decisive change from saying remuneration 'shall be determined by the company in general meeting.' Companies took precisely this opportunity, and soon directors were regularly found paying themselves multi-million figures with little regard for procedure. 73 As pay grew and attracted public criticism, the Cadbury Report supported the novel suggestion that a committee of 'independent' directors could play a legitimising role.
74
The curious theory, which went into the UK Corporate Governance Code, was that a comply-orexplain Code could define 'independence' of directors. It was possible to be 'independent' when you had depended on the people you were paying to get your job. The Greenbury Report, overseen by the chairman of Marks & Spencer, issued a further Code of Best Practice, which ultimately went into the Listing Rules and the Code. 75 Other suggestions included requiring that pay was 'performance related'. This goal that was said to be achievable by giving directors share options, ambitiously entitled 'long-term incentive plans'.
76
These measures did not halt rising pay rates. So then it was said that shareholders should become more active in casting their votes at meetings. Cadbury Committee, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1 December 1992). This partly followed the model set by the US. The calls for more 'independent' directors appear to have a history as a diversionary tactic against reform to require responsibility to employees and other stakeholders, both in the US and UK. 85 Michigan LR 1, arguing that such 'incentive pay' compounds agency costs as managerial income become undiversified, and they will be more risk averse, unwilling to make innovative changes that are out of the ordinary. From this, the conclusion could well be drawn that putting the law back to the traditional position, where the general meeting sets pay (the actual figure, not just the policy), will reverse the seemingly arbitrary upward trend. However, UK company law has since 1947 given a simple majority of members the power to dismiss any director, with 28 days' notice and a fair hearing, for any reason determined by the members.
83
Members can also give specific instructions to the board, albeit that this typically requires a 75 per cent resolution. 84 For instance, a resolution could tie pay packages to a multiple of earnings of other staff members. 85 At any time, shareholders could have nullified the 1985 rule change. But why did pay already seem to be rising (if not so fast) and why had shareholders in no FTSE100 company coupled resolutions to dismiss boards to executive pay?
The answer is, shareholders -particularly UK asset managers who have come to monopolise shareholder rights -deliberately chose to support executive pay rises. For instance, asset managers surveyed in 1999 'indicated that they supported bigger salary increases for UK executives'.
86
If the goal were pay reduction, removing pay decisions completely from conflicted directors might be necessary, but giving binding votes to shareholding intermediaries would not be sufficient. It might even be said to be harmful, if asset managers were the source of the widely perceived 'feline obesity' epidemic.
87
Piketty's view was that 'only dissuasive taxation' would do the job, as it affects the 'social norms' regarding pay. 88 This may be persuasive, but as part 2(3) will explore below, the regulatory framework that enables conflicted asset managers and banks to vote with 'other people's money', helped create those social norms and act upon them.
(b) Germany
If the UK picture becomes ambiguous upon closer inspection, Germany's case is even less clear. general meeting) §227 (executives can be removed at any time, without prejudice to contractual pay claims). Revised in 1884 without change. Handelsgesetzbuch 1897 §231 (executives can be removed at any time, without prejudice to contractual pay claims) §245 (requirements for pay for supervisory board members as a percentage of profits; pay can only follow a general meeting resolution). Aktiengesetz 1937 §78 (supervisory board to ensure executive pay is reasonable) §98 (supervisory board members paid according to the constitution, which can only be changed by general meeting resolution). The frustrating difficulty is that tax incentive arguments can cut both ways. You could equally argue, for example, "if directors are subject to a higher marginal rate of tax, they will want to increase their pay further to compensate for what tax is taking away."
Empirical evidence does not clearly falsify or substantiate either assertion. In any event, the tax changes came some time after the initial rises in pay. So, if German executive pay appears less related to rules on the board/shareholder power balance (i.e. the rules did not change but top incomes did) which other factors mattered?
The essential point seems to be that shareholder rights were dominated by banks from about 1923.
104
Back then, banks gradually assumed the function of holding shares, and casting votes on their clients' behalf through no better reason than their dominant market position, and a quirk of property law that required shares to be certificated. This practice was codified in the Aktiengesetz 1937, 105 and was never reversed after the fall of the fascist dictatorship, despite continued proposals. 106 So, an answer to why German executive salaries took off from 1993 necessarily involves the psychology of bankers after reunification, as addressed below.
It is worth noting briefly that in Switzerland, a similar legal framework had developed, until a vote was held in 2013, literally called the 'People's Initiative against Rip-off Salaries'.
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The campaign targeted rising executive pay. Its method was to ban banker intermediary voting, require the board compensation committee be elected by shareholders, and require pension funds (whose structure is regulated so that beneficiaries have a democratic voice) to be active in casting votes. It resulted in the second highest ever vote in a Swiss referendum, 108 and immediately attracted the derision of a number of eminent German corporate lawyers. 109 The novel approach is to remove power, and the conflict of interest, both from the board and financial intermediaries.
(c) United States
In the US similar changes to the UK took place, but earlier. Nineteenth century corporation law treatises, like Victor Morawetz in 1886, thought it 'would be contrary to established principles to allow the directors or other agents of a corporation to fix their own compensation'. 110 
Similar to
German regulation, compensation should be fixed by a corporation's charter, or the by-laws adopted by a majority of members.
111
The second option appears to have been widely exercised. 104 The Treasury created a 'Salary Stabilization Unit' which processed 750,000 requests a year, and whose approval was necessary to increase wages for those earning above $5,000.
120
However, this remarkable experiment ended shortly after the War.
Why did top incomes continue to compress post-war, but begin to rise in the early 1970s? In a second judgment, Chancellor Chandler held board members could not be liable unless they showed 'reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the whole body of stockholders', taking actions which are 'without the bounds of reason'. 131 Faced with this legal position, the response of shareholding institutions who were democratically accountable to their contributors (i.e. most state public pension and trade union pension funds, not asset managers) was to push for the retraction of pay decisions from directors' hands. In Delaware, charter amendments can only be instigated on the initiative of directors -not members (an exceptional practice, from a comparative viewpoint). Shareholders can, however, make proposals which put heavy pressure on the board if there is a majority outcome. Perhaps in order to garner more support, the first step taken was to propose amendments for non-binding 'say on pay ' executive pay, the identity and attitudes of shareholding institutions -asset managers and banksis fundamental. We return to this in part 2(3). But for now, the picture does not square with the argument that absence of exclusive shareholder voice was the only cause of the rise. 
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In short, the default rules of employment allow corporations to take everything, give less back, and call the difference profit. But if those rules are altered through agreement or law, the assumption that returns to capital exceed growth could change: in Piketty's terminology, perhaps to make r = g or r < g. The following year, the European Convention on Human Rights held (relevant for all Europe) that ECHR article 11 was incompatible with a complete closed shop. 161 This was eventually held to mean freedom 'from' association with a trade union. 162 The Employment Act 1990 made a complete prohibition on any closed shop, and it remains today. 163 It remains questionable whether unions are still able to make 'fair share' agreements, so that non-union members make reasonable contributions for the benefits of being in a workplace with collective bargaining. Another way of changing the cost/benefit equation of collective action, and maybe discouraging union membership, is procedural requirements before collective action becomes lawful.
173
The Trade Union Act 1984 installed various incompetently drafted rules requiring (in summary) unions to conduct ballots before collective action, with every employee included and none excluded, to warn employers, notify them of the results.
174
After subsequent revisions, 175 and halting case law, 176 a draconian interpretation of the rules was applied from the financial crisis to the start of the 2010 government's austerity programme. Hostile first instance judges granted injunctions against strikes, until appellate courts finally put the legal uncertainty to rest. 177 However, the obvious frustrating effect upon the right to strike encourages the view that "Thatcher's anti-trade union laws" are responsible for the decline in union membership, 178 and consequent rise in inequality. Indeed, in the UK it is chronologically difficult to separate suppression of collective action from changes to government promotion, and union member enrolment practice. This makes comparison all the more useful.
(b) Germany
German freedom of association, and the right to take collective action, has remained roughly constant since it was enshrined in the post-war constitution, the Grundgesetz 1949 article 9(3).
179
Because of Germany's bitter experience with the compulsory, nationalised Nazi union (Deutsche Arbeitsfront) from 1933, after 1945 unions did not pursue a 'closed shop' strategy, where employees could not opt out. 180 The Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht) holds collective action, including a strike, is lawful if it is for the purpose of achieving a collective agreement.
181
Collective action must also be proportionate, with an emphasis on attempting negotiation.
182
'Secondary' action (or solidarity striking) is lawful when it fulfils the same requirements.
183
Ballots, and giving express warning employers, are not a statutory requirement for a strike, but trade union rulebooks invariably require that ballots will take place. In short, it is harder to unravel workplace participation when people have got legal rights to vote, and harder to drive social division, than in a single channel system.
(c) United States
Like the UK, the US operates a single channel of workplace representation, if anything at all.
The 'ossification of American labor law' is a theory that emphasises no significant legislative . 199 There appears to be an obvious role here (and an interesting contrast to Tony Blair's tenure from 1997 to 2007) for the efficacy of social welfare, tax and fiscal stimulus policies, particularly in East Germany. The impact on the statistics of the rapid improvements in Eastern Germany cannot be overestimated. 200 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act 1974, arguably, is a very important labour law, discussed below at part 2(3)(c).
deadlock in judicial precedent and political 'shutdown'. 201 There is a real threat, a despondent tale might continue, to the survival of American labour rights. In the public sector, state governors press to require referendums for any collective agreement. far higher than the UK, suggesting that the highest American earners are far more exposed to the propensity of the American economy for repeated financial crisis. 209 Second, the US population has grown far more substantially than the UK's or Germany's over the period covered. 210 So, although all charts show 'raw' union membership numbers (not density 211 ) the relative fall in union membership after 1980 is greater: adjusted for population, the mirror effect would be even more striking.
212
In the private sector, union membership density was already in decline from 1954. Germany, in 1900 54m, 1950 68m, and 2010 81m. Thus, the US population more than doubled from 1950-2010, whereas it is rose by roughly 25% in the UK and Germany in the same time. 211 For recent density statistics, see OECD, Trade Union Density (1999-2013), methodology explained here. US density was 10.8%, while the UK was 25.4%, and Germany 17.7%. Union density differs again from collective bargaining coverage, and so is not a simple guide to union bargaining power. 212 The reason this article used charts based on raw numbers (and the choice was by no means 'right'), was that the density statistics are historically less complete, and method changes with the statistical office's definition of the labour market size: in turn it depends on methodology for calculating unemployed people (e.g. surveys and estimates? Benefit claimant count?). 213 On private sector numbers, see WT Dickens and JS Leonard, 'Accounting for the Decline in Union Membership, 1950 Membership, -1980 Membership, ' (1985 217 This reflects the idea that labour markets are not like any other market because the 'commodity' being traded (the person) is capable of negotiating its own price, reflecting on its evaluation of self-worth, and being motivated positively or negatively to work with others. When corn or capital is bought and sold, at any price, it does not really notice. It follows that collective to regulate the price of labour may be essential to promote trade: unequal bargaining power is the true restraint. This work tends (and rightly so) to be carefully indeterminate and qualified in its conclusions, because many countries have not experienced such a decline and are subject to the same pressures. The evidence shows, not merely that the law is a more significant factor among those socio-economic factors: the law determines the relevance of all factors absolutely. This stands to reason, because if you consciously aimed to reduce or increase union membership, and inequality, legal reform is a logical way to begin.
(3) SHAREHOLDER AND BENEFICIARY RIGHTS
The channels of worker participation in corporate governance shape inequality. 234 Rights do pay.
But beyond getting a 'fair day's wage for a fair day's work', eventually people should be able to retire with dignity. Over the 20 th century, more and more pay was saved, deferred in use, for old age. Savings needed to be invested. Mass investment was dispersing capital ownership, 235 and it was 'inventing retirement '. 236 This ushered a quiet reformation of capital markets because today the greatest source of money for shares and securities comes from employees saving: through pension, life insurance and mutual funds.
237
The division between capital and labour has grown less distinct. property or of a service is merely a measure of the strength of the bargaining power of the person who owns the one or renders the other, under the particular legal rights with which the law endows him, and the legal restrictions which it places on others.' Also J Pen, Income Distribution (1971) 361, 'I claim that if power remains concentrated at the top, the distribution of the firm's income among senior and junior employees will be a reflection of this command structure.' 235 n.b. Piketty (2014) ch 1 defines 'capital' to be the same as property. In contrast, the law usually defines capital as the sum of valuable assets invested in a company, which it may use for production. For this end, AA Berle, 'Property, Production and Revolution' (1965) 65 Columbia Law Review 1, draws a useful distinction between 'productive' property that is used for the purpose of production (whose use is differently regulated or taxed), and 'passive' property which is consumed by individuals.
The most important capital regulation is that 'legal capital' (the sum initially invested by members) could traditionally not be to pay dividends unless (depending on the legal system) shareholders approved it, or directors certified a company's solvency. There had to be a surplus 'profit' beyond this sum. Traditionally, individual shareholders used to exercise their own voting rights. But in this historic shift, asset managers and banks (who carried out share trading) came to appropriate shareholder votes. The real contributors to equity (usually employees saving), the ones who are the ultimate beneficiaries of investment, became separated from economic voice. The stark reality is that 'shareholder value' became, not a problematic, but an utterly meaningless measure of economic success a long time ago: the 'value' could be going to an intermediary playing with other people's money, rather than the ultimate investor.
239
Ownership had never necessarily meant control, and contribution no longer meant participation in modern corporate governance.
240
Before and since the financial crisis, shareholder rights have been seen as solutions by some for particular problems, like rising executive pay. shareholder ownership structures (dispersed or blockholding), 253 it was noticed that 'the pension system is of crucial importance to the development of capital markets.' 254 For instance, the evidence shows that the size of stock markets increase with the quantity of money people saved for retirement. 255 Probably, this was the trigger for the extreme 'separation of ownership and control', in the sense originally identified by Gardiner Means in the US from 1916. 256 To be precise, the relationship between pensions and share ownership is this: if a country has a large income-indexed (rather than a minimum floor type) state pension system (the 'first pillar'), people's need to for retirement through occupational pensions ('second pillar'), and private pensions ('third pillar') is less urgent. This is a logical, and evidentially sound explanation, compared to the problematic suggestions that dispersion or blockholding might relate to legal origin, degrees of social democracy, or other amorphous factors.
261
What follows, in the most general sense, is that there is nothing inevitable about the current distribution of capital. It can be more or less widely dispersed. Left to themselves, existing corporations and financial institutions will have a private incentive to limit the supply of capital, whatever the social costs, because (at present) it can be used to retain economic power. . it does not follow that changing capital distribution to ensure r > g decreases inequality would be (if at all) the desirable method to reduce inequality. The only point is that it could be done: economic laws are only as unchangeable as real laws. To give a simple example, suppose 90% of the population hold an equal share of capital, but are poorer than the richer 10% who hold no capital and earn money solely from highly paid labour. In such a state, increasing return to capital would logically decrease inequality, because it would increase the income and wealth of the poorest. 263 As put by AA Berle, 'Property, Production and Revolution ' (1965) This includes the duty to follow specific instructions on votes held on trust.
281
This is the 'irreducible minimum core' of fiduciary obligation.
282
This was the consensus in the City, accepted as obvious by the Hampel Committee in 1998: asset managers have a duty to follow clients' instructions, and the duty arises whatever the formal legal relation to the client. 283 Fiduciary obligations of the asset manager are owed to clients in pooled funds over the aliquot stewardship with the aim of enhancing and protecting the value for the ultimate beneficiary or client.' 274 There is no barrier for policyholders of life insurance companies doing the same: a fact reflected in the requirement to fulfil the client's 'reasonable expectations'.
290
Even more, accountholders of high street banks have a right to instruct the bank. 291 But the difference in those forms of investment is that individual actors (without a representative voting system) face significant obstacles to take collective action and to make their preferences clear. 292 And on social and governance issues, particularly inequality, asset managers' preferences differ starkly. German corporate law still uses other people's votes to subsidise immense power for a cartel of bankers at the heart of Europe.
304
Because the law has essentially remained the same since 1937, and statistics are scant, it is impossible to identify the precise relationship between bank or shareholder power and income inequality. Moreover, statistics on top incomes, compiled by Piketty, are collected through tax receipts.
305
There has been widespread, long-term tax evasion in Germany (regrettably not unique), particularly among executives and bankers who refuse to pay their debts, while advising others on how to do the same. 306 This makes it likely that the inequality statistics underestimate the scale of German income disparity. What changed in 1993, when executive pay started its dramatic rise? Given that banker power was always exercised over shareholder votes, the answer may lie with the psychology of reunification: a time for rewards to begin.
(c) United States
Had Germany followed the US approach, banks would no longer be an issue. According to the orthodox view, if American bankers had 'tried to imitate the German bankers, [they] would have had to run their banks from jail.' 307 In particular, during the New Deal, brokers (who were usually banks or in the same position) were prohibited from voting for customers on whose behalf corporate stocks were purchased. 308 The ban, however, was not complete. In the years up to the global financial crisis, brokers had again begun to use other people's votes, including setting the executive pay of Walt Disney's Michael Ovitz. 309 The Dodd-Frank Act 2010 completed the ban, so that no intermediary bank can cast votes on its customers' behalf unless instructions are given. 310 Thus, German style banker dominance of shareholder votes was strangled at birth in the US, and is now as dead and buried as it is in Switzerland.
Instead, the plot for dominance of US shareholding intermediaries resembled the UK's but (as is the American way) its script was even more of a 'blockbuster'. The dispersion of US shareholding, the great separation of ownership and control first documented by Gardiner The experience led him to set up the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association for university staff, now TIAA-CREF.
315
In the 1930s, when trade unions began bargaining for occupational pensions beyond the social security minimum, they sought pension trusts controlled by the union. After a campaign by employers to regain control, the Taft-Hartley Act 1947 §302(c)(5)(B) required that boards of all pension funds that the employer paid into were to have equal representation of unions and employers. 316 These were collectively bargained, multi-employer schemes. They covered 3.3m workers in 1960, and 9.7m in 1988. 
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Financial deregulation allowed asset managers to trade ever more complex products for pension funds, while at the same time influencing an increasing number of votes in corporations who would buy those same products.
Could US beneficiaries instruct their investment advisers on how they wishes their votes to be cast? The basic answer appears to be 'yes'. The Investment Company Act 1940 and Investment Advisers Act 1940 are silent on the issue, so standard equitable principles apply. 322 Financial service growth matches growing inequality, and it began from the very time that people's retirement savings were growing, and were increasingly put into individual accounts. This suggests a very strong case that asset managers, who could exploit corporate power for their own ends, have been a significant causal contributor to overall growth in inequality.
CONCLUSION
This article has shown the evidence that corporations increase inequality in the UK, Germany and the US in three main ways. First, directors and institutional shareholders have been enabled set ever higher rates of executive pay. Second, inequality grew when people were deprived of a meaningful voice at work, even while corporate employers could appropriate the benefits of their employees' labour. Third, asset managers and banks have been enabled to take shareholder votes from other people's money, particularly retirement savings. Those votes made corporations overinvest in financial services, over-inflating the City of London, Frankfurt and Wall Street at the expense of economic stability. These changes in legal rights, to participate in corporate governance, are the greatest 'pre-tax' cause of rising inequality. By understanding legal and social change, it becomes clear that with careful, prudent reforms the modern corporation could become -not a threat to economic stability -but an institution that promotes social justice.
Ultimately questions of inequality and social justice are not just economic, but political and moral. Justice, at its most basic, means people getting what they are due.
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But while ancient 323 Justinian, Institutes (ca 540) Book I, Title I postenlightenment philosophy has consistently held the most important goal to be the improvement of the content our 'character' while lending each other a 'helping hand', 325 to bring forward everyone's 'capacity', 326 the 'utmost possible development of faculty in the individual human being', 327 and to ensure that 'the opportunity to develop individuality becomes fully actualized.' 328 If these arguments are persuasive, and we conceive that we should owe to one another a duty to fulfil these goals, 'social justice' means the creation of institutions for continual human development: 329 it is 'the first value of social institutions'. 330 Inequality holds back economic growth and development. 331 But its causes are not merely supply and demand, changing marginal utilities, technological advance, or globalisation. It happens through political choice. At the heart of change explained in part 2 were decisions of courts or legislatures to constrain economic voice, or to give people freedom so that everyone could participate in the economy.
Of course, it could be argued that the real 21 st century danger is that an increasingly unvaried monopoly capitalism will threaten to remove democracy in politics, just as it is being removed in the economy. 332 US government 'shutdown' in 2013 was an extreme example. EU 'austerity' and 'structural adjustment' are milder forms of the same phenomenon. Bank cartels and corporate monopolists, it might be said, will fund strategists, lobbyists and think-tanks who blame the public sector for ongoing economic crises. They will weaken welfare, and cut government, while pushing for trade deals to sign away the next government's powers to realise the will of its people. It will not matter, this argument would continue, what evidence there is about inequality, and its causes. Evidence will not matter once political decisions have been made in principle. The only alternative, we could be told to conclude, is to renew the force of government, to break financiers and oligarchs through tax and state power.
If a choice had to be made between monopoly capitalism and reviving strong democratic government, there is no question that government is infinitely preferable: democracy will not destroy markets, but monopolists threaten democracy. Yet this binary choice between 'private or public' vanishes once it is seen that all institutions, political and economic, have a governance structure, where people have rights, within rules that society is competent to make. In a world of mass corporations, mass democracies, and mass education, the state itself -though it remains a critical expression of democratic preference -becomes ever less unique. States lose the legitimacy of their old monopoly on violence. People will not be governed by threats and force, but only by consent and by law. Rule-making is delegated to new political bodies both transnational and local. As this deliberative process continues, so does the expansion of economic voice. A now-forgotten enemy of democracy possibly put it best. 'When you get a democratic basis for your institutions,' said the man who wrote the UK's first modern company law, 'you impose on yourselves the task of re-modelling the whole of your institutions, in reference to the principles that you have set up'.
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Those are principles that reject increasing inequality. They embrace the socially just corporation. 333 Mr Robert Lowe, HC Hansard Debs, Representation of the People Bill, Third Reading (15 July 1867) vol 188, col 1543.
